



Towards an Improved Bound on CBC Collision Probability and Its Applications

Ashwin Jha, Mridul Nandi

Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata

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- **How to get good bounds?**
 - ▶ Existing techniques and results.
 - ▶ Some new insights and results.

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 - ▶ Existing techniques and results.
 - ▶ Some new insights and results. (Work in progress!)

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- Invented in context of authentication (**CBC-MAC** [EMST, US Patent '78]).
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 - Trivial PRF distinguishers exist** when messages are chosen arbitrarily from \mathbb{B}^+ .

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- For an ℓ -block optionally padded message $\bar{M}^\dagger = (M_1, \dots, M_\ell)$, we have
 - ▶ **ECBC [BR, CRYPTO '00]**: finalizes with π_2 or π_3 depending upon the last block

$$\text{ECBC}(M) := \pi_b(\text{CBC}_{\pi_1}(\bar{M})).$$

- ▶ **FCBC [BR, CRYPTO '00]**: $\text{FCBC}(M) := \pi_b(\text{CBC}_{\pi_1}(M_{\ell-1}) \oplus M_\ell)$.

This **fixes both issue 1 and 2**.

[†] Here \bar{M} denotes the optional 10^* padding of M so that the padded M has bit-length in multiple of n .

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A tight estimation of the probability of CBC output collision gives tight PRF bounds.

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- Extended over q distinct messages $M^q = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$

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We are interested in $\text{CP}_{\ell}^{\text{type}}$ and $\text{CP}_{q, \ell, \sigma}^{\text{type}}$ for type $\in \{\text{eq}, \text{any}\}$.

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Reduces to $\text{CP}_{q,\ell,\sigma}^{\text{any}} = O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right)$ for $\ell < 2^{n/8}$. (**Better than BPR's bound for $\ell < 2^{n/8}$**)

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Application to PRF bound of $F \in \{\text{EMAC}, \text{ECBC}, \text{FCBC}\}$:

- Using [DGHKRo4]:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Feq}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) = O\left(\frac{q^2}{2^n}\right) \quad (\text{while } l < 2^{n/3})$$

- Using [BPRo5]:

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
We show that the underlying graph-based analysis has a flaw [JN, JMC '16].

Structure Graphs

Notations and Definitions:


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- Fix q distinct messages $M^q = (M_1, \dots, M_q)$:
 - ▶ Intermediate inputs tuple: $\mathbf{u}^\pi := (\mathbf{u}^\pi(M_1), \dots, \mathbf{u}^\pi(M_q))$.
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- ▶ Dictionary order, \preceq on \mathcal{I} : $(r, i) \preceq (r', i')$ iff
 - $r < r'$, or
 - $r = r'$ and $i \leq i'$.

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Block-vertex Structure Graph, $\mathcal{B}_\pi^M = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L})$, for a message M and permutation π :

- Vertex and edge labeled digraph.
- Vertex set, $\mathcal{V} := \mathfrak{v}^\pi(M)$.
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- $M = (1, 0, 2, 0, 2)$
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
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
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
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- Vertex and edge labeled digraph.
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
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
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Block-vertex Structure Graph, $\mathcal{B}_\pi^{M^q}$, for M^q and permutation π is simply the union of all M_i -walks.

Structure Graphs

Structure Graph, $\mathcal{S}_\pi^{M^q} = (\tilde{\mathcal{V}}, \tilde{\mathcal{E}})$, for M^q and a permutation π :

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Structure Graphs


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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- Main object of interest: $N_a^{M^q} := \{G : \text{Acc}(G) = a\}$.



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Results on Structure Graphs

- Lemma 8 in [BPR05]: Let G be a structure graph with a accidents then

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- $N_a = O(m^{2a})$. But, we may have better bound for $N_a(\mathbb{E})$ for small a .

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

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Counter-examples:



$$(a) M_{(1,1)} \oplus M_{(1,3)} \oplus M_{(1,5)} \oplus M_{(2,1)} = \mathbf{o} \quad (b) M_{(1,1)} \oplus M_{(1,2)} \oplus M_{(1,3)} \oplus M_{(2,1)} = \mathbf{o}.$$

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A different approach required to get $O(q^2/2^n)$ bound?

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- So, $\Pr[\text{Bad}] \leq \frac{q\ell^2}{2^n} + \frac{q^2\ell^4}{2^{2n}}$. [using trivial bounds on $N_1^{M_i}$ and $N_2^{(M_i, M_j)}$]
- Further, $N_1^{(M_i, M_j)}(\text{COLL} \wedge \neg\text{Bad}) = 1$ (non-bad graphs are union of paths).
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- The bound reduces to $O(q^2/2^n)$ for $\ell < \min\{q^{1/2}, 2^{n/4}\}$.

A Simple Proof of Tight Bound on $\text{CP}_{q,\ell,\sigma}^{\text{any}}$ [JN16]

- BPR's bound implicitly uses the restriction $\ell \leq 2^{n/4}$.
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Can we do better in terms of ℓ ?

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Using $\varphi = \ell / \sqrt{d'(\ell)}$, we get

$$\text{CP}^\Pi(M^q) \leq O\left(\frac{q\ell\sqrt{d'(\ell)}}{2^n}\right) + \sum_{a \geq 2} \frac{N_a(\text{COLL} \wedge \neg \text{Cyc}_\varphi)}{2^{an}}.$$

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
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- ▶ We characterize all structure graphs realizable by two messages (M_i, M_j) with accidents 2 that satisfy $\text{COLL}^\Pi(M_i, M_j)$.
- ▶ This characterization also gives an improvement (over [DGHKRo4]) for $\text{CP}_\ell^{\text{eq}}$.


Accident 2 Graphs having ℓ^2 choices



(a)




(b)




(c)

A closer estimation of probability bound for graphs of types (a) helps in adjusting the ℓ^2 factors arising in (c).

Accident 2 Graphs having less than ℓ^2 choices




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- Proof uses tools from theory of free monoids. [potential to obtain sharper bounds]

Improved Bound on $CP_{q,\ell,\sigma}^{\text{any}}$ and CP_{ℓ}^{eq}

Message type = eq:

- ▶ $N_1(\text{COLL}) = 1$ (only non-cyclic walks are possible)
- ▶ Combining with the bounds for $N_2(\text{COLL})$, we have

$$CP_{\ell}^{\text{eq}} \leq \frac{1}{2^n} + O\left(\frac{t(\ell)}{2^{2n}}\right) + O\left(\frac{\ell^6}{2^{3n}}\right).$$

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Message type = any:

- ▶ Recall that $N_1(\text{COLL} \wedge \neg \text{Cyc}_{\ell/\sqrt{d'(\ell)}}) = q\ell\sqrt{d'(\ell)}$.
- ▶ Combining with the bounds for $N_2(\text{COLL})$, we have

$$CP_{q,\ell,\sigma}^{\text{any}} \leq O\left(\frac{2q\ell\sqrt{d'(\ell)}}{2^n} + \frac{q^2\ell^2}{2^{2n}} + \frac{q^2\ell^6}{2^{3n}}\right).$$

- ▶ The bound reduces to $O(q^2/2^n)$ for $\ell < 2^{n/3}$. (improves over [JN16])

Conclusion

1. Revisited the collision analysis of CBC function.
2. Improved bounds on collision probability of CBC for eq and any type messages.
3. CP bounds imply improved PRF bounds for EMAC, ECBC and FCBC.

Thank you.